ProGRank:通过探针梯度重排序防御密集检索器RAG的语料库投毒攻击 / ProGRank: Probe-Gradient Reranking to Defend Dense-Retriever RAG from Corpus Poisoning
1️⃣ 一句话总结
这篇论文提出了一种名为ProGRank的新方法,它无需额外训练,通过分析检索模型在轻微扰动下的梯度稳定性来识别并过滤掉被恶意篡改的文本,从而有效保护基于检索增强生成(RAG)的系统免受语料库投毒攻击,同时保持了良好的检索效果。
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves the reliability of large language model applications by grounding generation in retrieved evidence, but it also introduces a new attack surface: corpus poisoning. In this setting, an adversary injects or edits passages so that they are ranked into the Top-$K$ results for target queries and then affect downstream generation. Existing defences against corpus poisoning often rely on content filtering, auxiliary models, or generator-side reasoning, which can make deployment more difficult. We propose ProGRank, a post hoc, training-free retriever-side defence for dense-retriever RAG. ProGRank stress-tests each query--passage pair under mild randomized perturbations and extracts probe gradients from a small fixed parameter subset of the retriever. From these signals, it derives two instability signals, representational consistency and dispersion risk, and combines them with a score gate in a reranking step. ProGRank preserves the original passage content, requires no retraining, and also supports a surrogate-based variant when the deployed retriever is unavailable. Extensive experiments across three datasets, three dense retriever backbones, representative corpus poisoning attacks, and both retrieval-stage and end-to-end settings show that ProGRank provides stronger defence performance and a favorable robustness--utility trade-off. It also remains competitive under adaptive evasive attacks.
ProGRank:通过探针梯度重排序防御密集检索器RAG的语料库投毒攻击 / ProGRank: Probe-Gradient Reranking to Defend Dense-Retriever RAG from Corpus Poisoning
这篇论文提出了一种名为ProGRank的新方法,它无需额外训练,通过分析检索模型在轻微扰动下的梯度稳定性来识别并过滤掉被恶意篡改的文本,从而有效保护基于检索增强生成(RAG)的系统免受语料库投毒攻击,同时保持了良好的检索效果。
源自 arXiv: 2603.22934