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arXiv 提交日期: 2026-06-28
📄 Abstract - Learning to Bid in Discriminatory Auctions with Budget Constraints

We study repeated bidding in multi-unit discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for a single bidder with per-round utility equal to value minus $\alpha$ times payment, where $\alpha\in[0,1]$ is a cost-of-capital parameter. The bidder aims to maximize cumulative utility over $T$ rounds subject to a total budget $B$. The problem is challenging even without budgets: the action space is exponential in $M$, the maximum demand of the bidder and the valuation vector (context) varies over time. Exploiting a decomposition of utility across units, we develop polynomial-time learning algorithms based on shortest paths in a directed acyclic graph, obtaining sublinear regret under both full-information and bandit feedback. In the bandit setting, the regret is independent of the number of contexts due to complete cross-learning: observing the utility of the chosen action under the realized context reveals the utility for the same action under all counterfactual contexts. With budget constraints, when the average normalized per-round budget $\rho=\frac{B}{MT}<1$, we design a coupled primal-dual algorithm in which the DAG-based procedure uses dual-adjusted edge weights for primal updates, while online gradient descent updates the dual variable, yielding $\rho$-approximate sublinear regret. Finally, we give implementations whose per-round time and space are independent of the number of contexts, enabling scalability to large or even infinite context spaces.

顶级标签: machine learning reinforcement learning
详细标签: bidding auctions budget constraints regret primal-dual 或 搜索:

预算约束下歧视性拍卖中的出价学习 / Learning to Bid in Discriminatory Auctions with Budget Constraints


1️⃣ 一句话总结

该论文针对预算有限且需要长期参与多物品歧视性拍卖的投标者,提出了一种基于有向无环图最短路径的高效学习算法,能在不完全知道对手信息和市场情况的环境下,实现几乎最优的累计收益,并且算法的计算复杂度不受出价场景数量影响,从而可扩展至大规模甚至无限场景。

源自 arXiv: 2606.29252